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IMPROVING JUSTICE AND AVOIDING COLONIZATION  
IN MANAGING CLIMATE CHANGE RELATED DISASTERS: 
A CASE STUDY OF ALASKA NATIVE VILLAGES 
 
E. Barrett Ristroph* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
From severe weather to flooding and rising sea levels, climate 
change has begun to affect the well-being of communities across 
America.1 There has been an increase in climate change-related 
disasters, including disasters associated with coastal flooding and 
erosion as well as those related to increasingly severe storms.2 
American communities have increasingly called on their state and 
national government for help in the face of severe storms and 
flooding disasters.3 Small, impoverished, and indigenous 
                                                
* Ristroph is a lawyer, planner, mediator, and researcher living in Fairbanks, 
Alaska, USA. She is the owner of Ristroph Law, Planning, and Research, which 
provides services at a reasonable cost to tribes, communities, and agencies 
related to natural resources, hazard mitigation, government, and climate change 
adaptation. She also serves as counsel to Gazewood and Weiner, P.C., and as a 
mediator for the Alaska Superior Court in Fairbanks. She completed a Ph.D. at 
the University of Hawaii-Manoa in 2018 on how Alaska Native Villages are 
adapting to climate change and how laws and planning help or hinder. 
Originally from Cajun Country, Louisiana, USA, she has gained perspective 
from living and working in the Northern Mariana Islands, the Philippines, 
Hawaii, Arctic Alaska and Russia.  Through her work, she hopes to build 
bridges between communities in South Louisiana, Alaska, and the Pacific 
Islands that are struggling with climate change and the need for sustainable 
development. 
1 John Walsh et al., Our Changing Climate, in CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN 
THE UNITED STATES: THE THIRD NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 19, (Jerry M. 
Melillo, Terese (T.C.) Richmond, & Gary W. Yohe, eds., 2014). 
2 Suwan Shen & E. Barrett Ristroph, Are Climate-Vulnerable Communities 
Getting More Disaster Declarations? A Case Study of Flood-Prone Indigenous 
Communities in Alaska, NAT. HAZARDS REV. (forthcoming) (2019); Jennifer 
Leaning & Debarati Guha-Sapir, Natural Disasters, Armed Conflict, and Public 
Health, 369 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 1836 (Nov. 2013). 
3 A. Cavallo, Disaster Cost Index, ALASKA DIVISION OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, (Jan. 20, 2015); R. Steven Daniels, The Rise 
of Politics and the Decline of Vulnerability as Criteria in Disaster Decisions of 
the United States, 1953-2009, 37 DISASTERS 669 (2013); FEMA, Disaster 
Declarations Summary - Open Government Dataset, 
https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/28318 
[https://perma.cc/CV76-YG3D] (last visited Dec. 5, 2018); Bruce R. Lindsay,  
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communities are among the populations that may be particularly 
vulnerable to climate change and climate-related disasters because 
they may require additional assistance.4  
Principles of climate justice suggest that those who are the most 
responsible for climate change should assist non-contributing, at-
risk populations in adapting to climate change and responding to 
disasters.5 While there are strong arguments for providing 
impoverished indigenous communities with climate change 
adaptation and disaster assistance, there is a danger that aid can have 
the effect of further “colonizing” these communities by reducing 
their ability to make decisions about their own fates6 and increasing 
their dependence on government resources.7  Providing assistance 
with disasters and climate change adaptation while ignoring the 
legacy of colonialism may also perpetuate colonialism through 
Western interventions that do not serve the long-term needs of 
indigenous communities.8  Consistent with the procedural aspects of 
climate justice principles, assistance needs to take place in a manner 
                                                
FEMA’s Disaster Relief Fund: Overview and Selected Issues, Congressional 
Research Service (May 7, 2014); Francis X. McCarthy, FEMA’s Disaster 
Declaration Process: A Primer, Congressional Research Service, 13-14 (Nov. 
12, 2014); Andrew Reeves,  Political Disaster: Unilateral Powers, Electoral 
Incentives, and Presidential Disaster Declarations, 73 THE JOURNAL OF 
POLITICS 1142, 1144 (2011). 
4 W. Neil Adger & Jon Barnett, Four Reasons for Concern about Adaptation to 
Climate Change, 41 ENVT. & PLANNING A 2800 (2009); T.B. Bull Bennett et al., 
Indigenous Peoples, Lands, and Resources, in Melillo, et al., supra note 1, at 
297; Elizabeth Ann Kronk Warner and Randall S. Abate, International and 
Domestic Law Dimensions of Climate Justice for Arctic Indigenous Peoples, 43 
OTTAWA LAW REV. 113 (2013). 
5 D. R. Nelson et al., Adaptation to Environmental Change: Contributions of a 
Resilience Framework, 32 ANNU. REV. ENVIRON. RESOUR. 395, 410 (2007).  
6 Emilie S. Cameron, Securing Indigenous Politics: A Critique of the 
Vulnerability and Adaptation Approach to the Human Dimensions of Climate 
Change in the Canadian Arctic, 22 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 103, 104 (2012); 
Elizabeth Marino, The Long History of Environmental Migration: Assessing 
Vulnerability Construction and Obstacles to Successful Relocation in 
Shishmaref, Alaska, 22 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 374, 380 (2012); DANIEL R. 
WILDCAT, RED ALERT!: SAVING THE PLANET WITH INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE, at 
39 (2009).  
7 Shannon Michele McNeeley, Seasons out of Balance: Climate Change 
Impacts, Vulnerability, and Sustainable Adaptation in Interior Alaska, 37 
(2009); Henry Huntington et al., The Changing Arctic: Indigenous Perspectives,  
in ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT - SCIENTIFIC REPORT 91, 62 (2005); 
Henry P. Huntington et al., Demographic and Environmental Conditions Are 
Uncoupled in the Social-Ecological System of the Pribilof Islands, 28 POLAR 
RESEARCH 119, 125 (2009). 
8 Cameron, supra note 6, at 112. 
	  100 
 
that avoids interfering with indigenous sovereignty and promotes 
indigenous community participation.9  
The purpose of this article is to outline national and Alaskan 
legal frameworks for disaster assistance; to show how these 
frameworks are reactive rather than proactive; and to illustrate how 
they can be problematic when utilized for communities that are not 
familiar with them and might not be adequately prepared to make 
post-disaster decisions. I focus on Alaska Native Villages (ANVs), 
which are federally recognized tribes and sovereign nations that are 
located within the State of Alaska and are subject to federal 
regulation. These indigenous communities, which comprise 41% of 
the United States’ federally recognized tribes,10 are typically small, 
impoverished, and remote, and they tend to value traditional 
lifeways based on subsistence hunting and fishing.11 I conclude that 
ANVs are not always able to get the help they need through these 
frameworks, which has led to climate injustice.	  
ANVs are a critical case study for two reasons. First, compared 
to the rest of the country, climate change is happening far more 
rapidly in Arctic Alaska (where many ANVs are located).12 Arctic 
and sub-Arctic Alaska are the only places in the United States 
dealing with the problem of melting permafrost.13 ANVs are 
grappling with changes that have resulted in flooding and erosion, 
the decline of species on which they subsist, melting permafrost, and 
the delayed formation of the land-fast ice that used to serve as a 
protective barrier from destructive fall storms.14 
                                                
9 Elizabeth Ann Kronk Warner & Randall S. Abate, International and Domestic 
Law Dimensions of Climate Justice for Arctic Indigenous Peoples, 43 Ottawa L. 
Rev. 113, 127 (2013); Jouni Paavola & W. Neil Adger, Fair Adaptation to 
Climate Change, 56 ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS 594, 596 (2006); Sophie 
Theriault, Indigenous Peoples and Climate Change Policies: A Comparative 
Assessment of Indigenous Governance Models in Canada, Ch. 9 in LOCAL 
CLIMATE CHANGE LAW: ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN CITIES AND OTHER 
LOCALITIES (Benjamin J. Richardson, ed., 2012). 
10 BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, INDIAN ENTITIES RECOGNIZED AND ELIGIBLE TO 
RECEIVE SERVICES FROM THE UNITED STATES BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, 82 
FED. REG. 4915 (2017). 
11 E. Barrett Ristroph, Alaska Tribes’ Melting Subsistence Rights, 1 ARIZ J 
ENVTL POL 47, 49 (2010). 
12 F. Stuart Chapin III et al., Alaska, 514, in Melillo, et al., supra note 1.  
13 Id. 
14 Id., C.B. Field et al. Summary for Policy Makers, pp. 1-34 in CLIMATE 
CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY, CONTRIBUTION OF 
WORKING GROUP II TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE 
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Second, climate change and disasters add to challenges 
already faced by ANVs related to their economic situation and 
colonization. The federal government arguably contributed to 
ANVs’ climate vulnerability by requiring some ANVs to 
permanently settle in flood-prone locations not meant for year-round 
settlement.15 Some Alaska Natives and commentators perceive 
ongoing colonization in terms of the imposition of state and federal 
laws and social and economic practices that conflict with traditional 
practices and values of ANVs.16  These laws and practices have 
reduced the self-sufficiency of ANVs and limited their control over 
resources that could aid adaptation and resilience.17 ANVs typically 
lack the resources, workforce, and jurisdiction to undertake large-
scale climate change adaptation and disaster response actions on 
their own.18 While ANVs retain sovereignty over their members,19  
                                                
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (C.B. FIELD ET AL, EDS. 
2014); Ristroph, supra note 11, at 51-58. 
15 Robin Bronen, Climate-Induced Displacement of Alaska Native Communities, 
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 5 (2013), 
www.Brookings.Edu/Research/Papers/2013/01/30-Arctic-Alaska-Bronen 
[https://perma.cc/93S9-ZMRE]; Jessica Scott, Move or Wait for the Flood and 
Die: Protection of Environmentally Displaced Populations through a New 
Relocation Law, 9 FLA. A&M U. L. REV. 369, 381 (2014); Robert J. Martin, The 
Village of Kivalina Is Falling into the Sea: Should CERCLA Section 9626 (B) Be 
Available to Move the Village from Harm’s Way, 2 EARTH JURISPRUDENCE & 
ENVTL. JUST. J. 1 (2012). 
16 INDIAN LAW AND ORDER COMMISSION, A ROADMAP FOR MAKING NATIVE 
AMERICA SAFER - REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS OF THE UNITED 
STATES, May 2015, 47, available at 
https://www.aisc.ucla.edu/iloc/report/files/A_Roadmap_For_Making_Native_A
merica_Safer-Full.pdf [https://perma.cc/7RTL-UUVT]; Harold Napoleon, 
Alaska Natives: Still a People in Peril, ALASKA DISPATCH, Oct. 18, 2014, 
available at http://www.adn.com/article/20141018/alaska-natives-still-people-
peril [https://perma.cc/2F9F-RVNM]; Lisa Wexler, Looking across Three 
Generations of Alaska Natives to Explore How Culture Fosters Indigenous 
Resilience, 51 TRANSCULTURAL PSYCHIATRY 73, 80 (2014); THOMAS BERGER, 
A LONG AND TERRIBLE SHADOW: WHITE VALUES, NATIVE RIGHTS IN THE 
AMERICAS SINCE 1492, at 130 (2d ed. 1999); Marino, supra note 6, at 375, 378. 
17 Philip A. Loring et al. , “Community Work” in a Climate of Adaptation: 
Responding to Change in Rural Alaska, 44 HUMAN ECOLOGY 119, 122 (2016); 
Amanda H. Lynch & Ronald D. Brunner, Context and Climate Change: An 
Integrated Assessment for Barrow, Alaska, 82 CLIMATIC CHANGE 93, 97 (2007); 
Huntington (2005), supra note 7, at 91. 
18 E.B. Ristroph, Improving the Quality of Alaska Native Village Climate 
Change Planning, 11 J GEOG. & REGIONAL PLANNING 143 (2018). 
19 See 25 U.S.C. § 476 (h)(1) (“each Indian tribe shall retain inherent sovereign 
power to adopt governing documents under procedures other than those 
specified in this section”); Indian Tribal Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 103-176, 107 
	  102 
 
United States law has deprived them of jurisdiction over their 
traditional lands and natural resources.20 ANVs lack their own tax 
base 21 and often rely on external funding and consultants.22  
This article is based on dissertation research aiming to 
understand how ANVs are adapting to climate change and 
responding to disasters and how laws and planning processes help 
or hinder their efforts. My research involved multiple approaches, 
each of which I cover in more detail in a separate article.23 The first 
approach was to review studies on adaptations to climate change, 
studies on Alaska Natives, and commentaries on relevant laws. The 
second approach was to review those relevant laws themselves.  
The third approach involved 153 interviews and interview-
like conversations24 with ANV residents and people outside of those 
communities who make or influence laws that affect them. I 
specifically sought participants from ANVs for whom national 
disaster declarations were made due to flooding within recent 
decades. Of the fifty-nine ANVs from which my participants were 
drawn, forty-two had been included in a state disaster declaration 
                                                
Stat. 2004 (1993) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. (2010) (“Indian tribes 
possess the inherent authority to establish their own form of government, 
including tribal justice systems.”); Delaware Indians v. Cherokee Nation, 193 
U.S. 127 (1904) (“A tribe may determine who are to be considered members by 
written law, custom, intertribal agreement, or treaty with the United States.”); 
Kimball v. Callahan, 590 F.2d 768, 777-78 (9th Cir. 1979) (inherent power to 
determine membership does not depend on having a territorial base, so even 
tribes with no Indian country may retain this power); John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 
738 (Alaska 1999) (holding that ANCSA did not extinguish tribal sovereignty); 
Act of May 1, 1936, ch. 254, 49 Stat. 1250 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 473a) 
(amending the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 to include Alaska Natives). 
20  See 43 U.S.C. § 1603. 
21 Alaska Division of Community and Regional Affairs, Community Database 
Online, DIVISION OF COMMUNITY AND REGIONAL AFFAIRS, 
https://www.commerce.alaska.gov/dcra/DCRAExternal (last visited Dec. 5, 
2018)[ https://perma.cc/KEY7-MRQ6]. 
22 Richard J. T. Klein et al., Adaptation Opportunities, Constraints, and Limits, 
in CLIMATE CHANGE 2014 IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY 
WORKING GROUP II CONTRIBUTION TO THE IPCC FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT, 
GLOBAL AND SECTORAL ASPECTS 907 (2014). 
23 E.B. Ristroph, Presenting a Picture of Alaska Native Village Adaptation: A 
Method of Analysis, 5 SOCIOLOGY & ANTHROPOLOGY 762 (2017). 
24 This were conversations where participants essentially answered the interview 
questions but did not want to be formally interviewed. Interviews and 
conversations took place between June 2016 and March 2016 in person in ANVs 
and at conferences pertaining to ANVs, or by phone calls from Fairbanks to 
participants’ locations.  
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pertaining to a climate-related disaster during the study period, and 
thirty-six had been part of a national disaster declaration. Eighteen 
participants from ANVs that were the subjects of disaster 
declarations described the underlying events when interviewed.  
The fourth approach was to analyze community plans 
relevant to the fifty-nine ANVs from which I selected participants, 
including hazard mitigation plans required by the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for certain kinds of 
disaster assistance to be granted25 and plans related to economic 
development and land use. I used qualitative content analysis26 to 
identify major adaptation actions, relevant laws and agencies, 
facilitators, barriers, recommendations for change, and other themes 
emphasized in interviews, related conversations, and community 
plans.  
The fifth approach involved a review of the State of Alaska’s 
record of state-issued disaster declarations related to flooding and 
erosion from the initiation of state declarations under the Alaska 
Disaster Act (June 10, 1977) through the end of 2014. 27 The record 
indicates the nature of the disasters to which some of the 
declarations pertain, the communities or areas that were included in 
each disaster declaration, and indications as to which of these state 
declarations resulted in the issuance of a federal disaster declaration. 
I also reviewed FEMA’s record of the federal disaster declarations 
that are noted in the state record. 28  There are far fewer federal 
declarations since these require a higher threshold than state 
declarations. FEMA’s record indicated the underlying disaster for 
each declaration, the type of assistance issued, and the county or 
borough for which the declaration was issued. 
This research was authorized by the Institutional Review 
Board of the University of Hawaii, and ethical considerations 
                                                
25 42 U.S.C. § 5165(a). 
26 MATTHEW B. MILES & A. MICHAEL HUBERMAN, QUALITATIVE DATA 
ANALYSIS: AN EXPANDED SOURCEBOOK 56 (2d ed. 1994); JULIET CORBIN & 
ANSELM STRAUSS, BASICS OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH: TECHNIQUES AND 
PROCEDURES FOR DEVELOPING GROUNDED THEORY (3d ed. 2007). 
27 Cavallo, supra note 3. 
28 FEMA, FEMA Disaster Declarations Summary - Open Government Dataset, 
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, https://www.fema.gov/media-
library/assets/documents/28318 [https://perma.cc/W7HA-P7DD) (last visited 
Jan. 27, 2017]. 
	  104 
 
required keeping confidential the identity of research participants. 
For this reason, the names of participants and ANVs are generally 
not mentioned in this article.29  
	  
II.  FRAMEWORK TO PREVENT AND RESPOND TO DISASTERS 
I begin with a description of how an ANV can seek disaster 
assistance under the United States’ and Alaska’s laws. 
Understanding the legal system for disaster response is important 
because state and national assistance often come only after a disaster 
is officially declared at the federal level.30  This section describes 
the declaration system and discusses the literature that critiques it.  
 
A.  How Disaster Declarations Work 
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 
Assistance Act (Stafford Act)31 lays the groundwork for disaster 
relief and planning for natural disasters. It establishes the process 
for a Presidential (national) Disaster Declaration, which is required 
for many types of national disaster funding.32  
                                                
29 The differences in the questions answered by different participants (despite 
starting with two questionnaires—one for each set of participants) limited the 
ability to quantitatively compare responses between different participants. Given 
this limitation and the subjectivity of my coding, I decided that using inferential 
statistics was not appropriate. See H. RUSSELL BERNARD & GERY W. RYAN, 
ANALYZING QUALITATIVE DATA: SYSTEMATIC APPROACHES (1st ed. 2009); Yan 
Zhang & Barbara M. Wildemuth, Qualitative Analysis of Content, 1 ANALYSIS 1 
(2005). I thus avoid referring to specific numbers of participants in this article. 
To give an order of magnitude of the responses I got, I refer to “a few” (about 2 
to 5), “several” (about 6 to 10), “a number of” (10-30), or “many” (more than 
30). These categorizations are not statistically significant and should not be 
interpreted in that manner. 
30 Victor B. Flatt, Domestic Disaster Preparedness and Response, in THE LAW 
OF ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE  : U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS, 
481-509 (Michael Gerrard & Katrina Fischer Kuh ed., 2012); Robin Bronen, 
Climate-Induced Community Relocations: Creating an Adaptive Governance 
Framework Based in Human Rights Doctrine, 35 NYU REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 
357, 401 (2011); U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO),  ALASKA 
NATIVE VILLAGES, LIMITED PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE ON RELOCATING 
VILLAGES THREATENED BY FLOODING AND EROSION GAO-09-551, 43 (2009). 
31 Stafford Act, Pub. L. No. 93-288 (1974), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
5121-5206, as amended by  § 322 of the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (P.L. 
106-­‐ 390), Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 
109-295, 120 Stat. 1394 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).  
32 42 U.S.C. §§ 5122(1), 5191. 
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Before a presidential disaster can be declared, there must be 
a state or tribal disaster declaration.33 Alaska’s Disaster Act allows 
the state governor to declare a “disaster emergency” if a natural 
catastrophe or the outbreak of a disease causes or threatens to cause 
severe damage or loss of life.34 A disaster must meet a certain 
threshold (which is dependent on the local community’s resources) 
to garner a state declaration.35 While ANVs, as federally recognized 
tribes, could directly ask the president for a disaster declaration 
without going through the State of Alaska, this process involves 
cost-sharing requirements that the entity seeking a presidential 
declaration must bear. ANVs and other federally recognized tribes 
located in remote areas are often severely economically 
disadvantaged and not in a position to assume these costs.36  
Once a state or tribal disaster declaration has been made, 
FEMA advises the President whether to declare a disaster.37  In 
deciding what to recommend to the President, FEMA considers 
whether the disaster is beyond the capabilities of the affected state 
and local governments, such that federal assistance is necessary.38 
While there are criteria for how much funding a disaster merits, 
there are no clear criteria for whether a disaster is beyond the 
capacity of state and local governments.39 
Disasters addressed by the Stafford Act include hurricanes, 
tornados, storms, floods, tidal waves, tsunamis, earthquakes, 
                                                
33 42 U.S.C. § 5170(b). 
34 Alaska Stat. §§ 26.23.020, 26.23.900(2). 
35 Alaska Division of Homeland Security & Emergency Management, Public 
Assistance Overview (2010), https://ready.alaska.gov/recovery/PublicAssistance 
(https://perma.cc/48SZ-LQ4D). 
36 Rachelle E. Luft, Governing Disaster: The Politics of Tribal Sovereignty in 
the Context of (Un)natural Disaster, 39 ETHN. RACIAL STUD. 802, 808 (2016). 
37 44 C.F.R. § 206.37(c). Since the recommendations to the president are a 
matter of executive privilege and not accessible for analysis, researchers have 
little insight into how this process actually works. John T. Gasper, The Politics 
of Denying Aid: An Analysis of Disaster Declaration Turndowns, 22 J PUB. 
MGMT. & SOC. POL’Y 7 (2015). 
38 42 U.S.C. § 5170(a). 
39 Mary W. Downton & R.A. Pielke Jr., Discretion Without Accountability: 
Politics, Flood Damage, and Climate, 2 NAT. HAZARDS REV. 157, 158 (2001). 
FEMA’s Sep. 1, 1999 rule (44 C.F.R. § 206.48 - Factors considered when 
evaluating a Governor's request for a major disaster declaration) only provides 
criteria in determining the need for public and individual assistance. A 
preliminary damage assessment (not mentioned in the Stafford Act), conducted 
jointly by FEMA and the requesting state, is an important part of this 
consideration. 44 C.F.R. § 206.33 
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volcanic eruptions, landslides, snowstorms, and droughts.40 The 
exclusion of erosion from the definition of disaster is noteworthy 
since this slow-moving disaster plagues so many ANVs.41 Erosion 
is addressed through the national disaster regime only if it is sudden, 
such as when a storm occurs.42 
The exclusion of food-related disasters is also significant since 
these disasters can impact subsistence. 43 Many ANVs depend on 
subsistence practices for their nutritional and cultural needs.44 Given 
the high costs of flying commercial foods into remote villages that 
are off the road system, subsistence helps ensure food security.45 In 
                                                
40 42 U.S.C. § 5122. 
41 GAO, supra note 30;  U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, ALASKA BASELINE 
EROSION ASSESSMENT, STUDY FINDINGS AND TECHNICAL REPORT (2009). 
42 My search of national disaster declarations from the 1950s to 2014 revealed 
three instances mentioning erosion, including DR 1445 for “Severe Winter 
Storms, Flooding, and Coastal Erosion and Tidal Surge” in Alaska’s Aleutian 
Islands in 2012. 
43 I use the State of Alaska’s legal definition for subsistence:  
the noncommercial, customary and traditional uses of wild, 
renewable resources by a resident domiciled in a rural area of 
the state for direct personal of family consumption as food, 
shelter, fuel, clothing, tools, or transportation, for the making 
and selling of handicraft articles out of nonedible by-products 
of fish and wildlife resources taken for personal or family 
consumption, and for the customary trade, barter, or sharing 
for personal or family consumption.  
Alaska Stat. § 16.05.940. This definition does not convey the significance of 
subsistence to many Alaska Natives, who value it as a fundamental part of their 
culture. E. Barrett Ristroph, Alaska Tribes’ Melting Subsistence Rights, 1 ARIZ J 
ENVTL POL 49 (2010). 
44 Philip A. Loring et al., Ways to Help and Ways to Hinder: Governance for 
Effective Adaptation to an Uncertain Climate, 64 ARCTIC 73 (2011); Patricia 
Cochran, et al., Indigenous Frameworks for Observing and Responding to 
Climate Change in Alaska, 120 CLIMATIC CHANGE 557 (2013). 
45 Cochran, et al., supra note 44, at 560; Davin Holen, Fishing for Community 
and Culture: The Value of Fisheries in Rural Alaska, 50 NORTHERN FISHERIES 
403 (2014); McNeeley, supra note 7. By “food security,” I mean “a situation 
that exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic 
access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and 
food preferences for an active and healthy life.” See FOOD AND AGRICULTURE 
ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, THE STATE OF FOOD INSECURITY IN 
THE WORLD 2002 (2002), http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/y7352e/y7352e00.htm 
(https://perma.cc/VX5L-HDMH); Rachel Engler-Stringer, Food Security, 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF QUALITY OF LIFE AND WELL-BEING RESEARCH, 2326–27  
(Alex C. Michalos ed., 2014). In the context of ANVs, “preference” is 
particularly important since Western foods may be culturally unacceptable. See 
Mark Nuttall et al., Hunting, Herding, Fishing and Gathering: Indigenous 
Peoples and Renewable Resource Use in the Arctic, ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT 654, 649-690 (2005). Also important is the “active and healthy 
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addition, subsistence enables families to spend time together and 
pass down knowledge and values.46 There is no law providing 
specifically for the kind of disaster that occurs when ANV residents 
are not able to conduct their annual harvest of an important 
subsistence species. Federal47 and state48 laws do allow for 
"economic disasters" to be declared through the federal and state 
commerce departments,49 but these do not necessarily cover 
subsistence. 
As I noted above, a Presidential Disaster Declaration is 
important because of the relief that comes with it—funding, agency 
support, and even relocation.50 Once a national disaster is declared, 
FEMA utilizes the incident command system to coordinate the 
response with other agencies (and in some cases, the military). It 
provides public assistance51 to support government and non-
government entities and individual assistance for housing and other 
expenses.52 Payouts for disasters can be substantial. Congress 
provided roughly $120 billion for Hurricane Katrina and $60 billion 
for Hurricane Sandy recovery efforts.53 Nearly $6.9 million in 
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s_reports_studies (https://perma.cc/ACF4-NAB8); Nuttall et al., supra note 45, 
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47Magnuson-Stevens Fisheries and Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 94-265 
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48 Alaska Stat. §§ 44.33.285, 44.33.310. 
49 National disasters have been declared due to poor fisheries, typically related to 
hurricanes, floods, changes in ocean conditions, or algal blooms. HAROLD F. 
UPTON, COMMERCIAL FISHERY DISASTER ASSISTANCE, 6 (2011). 
50 42 U.S.C. §§ 5170b(b), 5172(b), 5173(d). 
51 42 U.S.C. § 5172; 44 C.F.R. § 206 Parts G-I. 
52 42 U.S.C. § 5174; 44 C.F.R. § 206 Parts E-F. 
53 Bruce R. Lindsay, “FEMA’s Disaster Relief Fund: Overview and Selected 





individual assistance was provided after an Interior Alaska riverine 
flooding disaster in 2009.54 While it is not clear whether post-
disaster funding is sufficient to revive pre-disaster economies, 55 this 
source of funding could be significant for a small, rural, and remote 
ANV with a limited basis for generating revenue.56 It is especially 
important for communities hoping to relocate; post-disaster 
assistance enabled the community relocations of Alatna and Eagle 
Village.  
In the absence of a Presidential Disaster Declaration, a 
community may still get assistance from the State of Alaska, though 
the amount is likely to be much smaller.57 Unless the state legislature 
approves a higher amount, the governor can provide up to $500,000 
to avoid an impending disaster or $1 million to respond to a state 
disaster declaration.58 
A great deal of research has noted the lack of any correlation 
between the issuance of disaster declarations and the amount of 
damage incurred by disaster-struck communities, which suggests 
that the issuance of disaster declarations relates more to politics than 
it does to the vulnerability of communities.59 This may lead to unjust 
consequences for ANVs that often lack political connections.  
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B.  Efforts to Address Disasters Before They Happen 
In the previous section, I talked about the billions of dollars that 
are spent attempting to restore disaster-stricken communities. In this 
section, I will talk about the far smaller amount of money spent in 
the arena of “hazard mitigation,” which seeks to reduce the risk of 
disasters related to climate change as well as other natural hazards. 
There is a lack of proactive spending despite a general agreement by 
experts that money spent on hazard mitigation yields benefits that 
well exceed the costs.60 
FEMA has several hazard mitigation programs that provide for 
disaster mitigation, preparation, and recovery, including the Hazard 
Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP), the Pre-Disaster Mitigation 
Program (PDM), and Flood Mitigation Assistance (FMA).61 FEMA 
allows a state or tribe that has received a disaster declaration in the 
last year to apply for HMGP funding, which the recipient can re-
grant to localities (or tribes that choose to be “sub-applicants”) to 
reduce their hazard risks.62 Rather than providing states with a set, 
consistent amount of funding, HMGP funds are calculated as a 
percentage of payouts made through the last disaster declaration.63 
FEMA’s PDM64 provides for projects similar to those covered 
by HMGP. For PDM, there need not have been a disaster 
declaration, and the amount of funding available is far less 
                                                
Declarations and Major Hazard Occurrences in the United States, 60 PROF. 
GEOGRAPHER 1, 13 (2008). 
60 Adam Rose et al., Benefit-Cost Analysis of FEMA Hazard Mitigation Grants, 
8 NAT. HAZ. REV. 97 (2007); David R. Godschalk et al., Estimating the Value of 
Foresight: Aggregate Analysis of Natural Hazard Mitigation Benefits and Costs, 
52 J ENVTL PLANNING & MNGMT 739 (Sep. 2009); John C. Whitehead and 
Adam Z. Rose, Estimating Environmental Benefits of Natural Hazard 
Mitigation with Data Transfer: Results from a Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal 
Emergency Management Agency Hazard Mitigation Grants, 14 MITIGATION 
AND ADAPTATION STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CHANGE 655 (Oct. 2009); Tim G. 
Frazier et al., Opportunities and Constraints to Hazard Mitigation Planning, 40 
APPLIED GEOGRAPHY 52 (June 2013). 
61 GAO, High-Risk Series, An Update, GAO-15-290 87 (2015).  
62 42 U.S.C. § 5170c; 44 C.F.R. §§ 201.7, 206.2(a) (16), 206.434(a), 206.436. 
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(whatever Congress chooses to allocate to the program that year).65 
The third program, FEMA’s FMA provides funds to states, 
territories, tribes, and local governments to prepare flood mitigation 
plans and carry out mitigation projects. FMA requires communities 
to participate in the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP).66  
ANVs face several challenges to getting funding through the 
programs mentioned above. First, to obtain funding to carry out 
projects through HMGP or PDM, the ANV needs to have an existing 
hazard mitigation plan.67 The creation of this plan is highly complex, 
and most ANVs that were able to produce these plans hired 
consultants to write them. Second, few, if any, ANVs are eligible 
for FMA because they are not eligible for NFIP. This relates to the 
fact that ANV tribal governments lack the jurisdiction over land that 
they must have in order to establish the flooding ordinances that are 
required for participation in NFIP.68  
Third, measures for which FEMA provides funding must be 
“cost-effective” or in the interest of NFIP.69 The challenge is that 
some benefits are not easily quantified (i.e., cultural values, mental 
health, and ecosystem services), and FEMA has a limited tolerance 
for unconventional calculation methods.70 This, along with the 
expenses associated with projects in remote ANVs, 71 impairs the 
ability of ANVs to get funding for measures that can benefit their 
communities and lifeways. Elizabeth Marino, an expert on disaster 
relief funding, points out the injustice of FEMA’s cost-effective 
standards for housing buyouts, noting that they focus on the value 
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69 44 C.F.R. §§ 79.6(d), 206.434(c); FEMA, Hazard Mitigation Assistance 
Unified Guidance, Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, Pre-Disaster Mitigation 




70 FEMA, supra note 69, at 50. 
71 GAO, supra note 30. 
	  111 
 
of the property rather than the protection of displaced peoples.72 
Properties that have a lower market value (even if they would be 
very expensive to rebuild in remote ANVs) may be less able to 
garner buyouts.73 
The Disaster Reform Act of 2018 did little to improve the pre-
disaster funding situation for ANVs.74 For example, Section 1234 of 
that Act amends 42 U.S.C. § 5133(f) to clarify that PDM awards 
must be cost-effective.75 Although this is already a FEMA 
requirement, it may increase the burden on remote ANVs that try to 
get their projects funded. Further, Section 1234 narrows eligibility 
for PDM in a manner similar to HMGP, so only state or tribes that 
have had disaster declarations in the last seven years can get PDM. 
76  This could reduce the incentive for states to prepare for climate 
change related disasters. Finally, Section 1234 allows FEMA to set 
aside from the Disaster Relief Fund (to which Congress chooses to 
add money after disasters) funds used on various post-disaster 
programs. 77  This money can go to technical and financial assistance 
under PDM. This may be helpful in the sense that it makes more 
funding available for grants, given that PDM is currently quite small 
compared to HMGP. Yet it carries forward the arbitrary notion of 
tying together hazard mitigation funding with how much was spent 
on a disaster declaration—a declaration which may or may not relate 
to a community’s vulnerability to disaster. 
Obstacles to getting FEMA assistance are noteworthy 
because FEMA plays the primary role in disaster response and 
preparedness in the United States. Still, other agencies with 
infrastructure-planning responsibilities do have roles in reducing 
disaster risk. Among the most important is the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD), which provides flexible 
funding to communities and tribes for infrastructure through the 
Community Development Block Grant Program (CDBG) and the 
Indian Development Grant Program. Funding specific to disaster 
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relief is available through the CDBG Disaster Recovery program, 
which extends recovery funding beyond what FEMA provides.78 
But this assistance is available only after a national disaster 
declaration, only to urban municipalities, and only such a quantity 
as Congress decides to provide in a post-disaster appropriation act.79 
 
C.  Previous Research Relevant to Disasters Affecting ANVs 
Other than articles calling for government assistance with 
community relocation, there is little literature specific to climate-
related disasters in Alaska.80  Various authors have, however, 
written about the physical and sociological impacts of and responses 
to the Exxon-Valdez oil spill.81 While they may not help a 
community navigate the legal and funding systems for getting 
natural disaster assistance, lessons from this oil spill could be 
instructive in terms of resilience to climate change and impacts to 
subsistence resources.  
One point that emerges from the articles written in response 
to the Exxon-Valdez spill is that Alaska Natives may have different 
processes than non-Natives for understanding, coping with, and 
responding to disasters.82 There is a need for responses that address 
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the particular concerns of Alaska Natives that both relate to their 
subsistence lifeways and cultural practices and contribute to 
healing.83 At worst, disaster responses that invalidate tribal concerns 
and fail to acknowledge tribal sovereignty can contribute to what 
some scholars see as the ongoing “permanent disaster” of 
colonization.84   
In sum, there is a robust top-down framework at the national 
level for responding to fast-moving natural disasters. There are 
substantially fewer resources available to help communities prepare 
for and prevent disasters. This is particularly problematic for slow-
moving disasters in Alaska related to climate change—specifically 
permafrost melt and erosion. It is also problematic for communities 
like ANVs that face challenges related to their eligibility for and 
access to resources needed for disaster management. While much 
research has been conducted on the need for assistance to ANVs 
facing climate change-related disasters, there is a lack of research 
on how the national disaster declaration system has affected ANVs 
who have received disaster assistance. Likewise, outside of the 
national framework there is a lack of research on how ANVs might 
better prepare for disasters on their own.  
 
III.  KEY FINDINGS 
A.  Overview of Disaster Declarations in Alaska 
State disaster declaration records provide some insight on 
the nature of climate-related85 disasters in Alaska. Between 1977 
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and 2019, there were 155 communities86 with state disaster 
declarations and 220 state disaster declarations in total.87 The 
Governor of Alaska requested a Presidential Disaster Declaration 
for approximately eighteen of these disasters; the request was denied 
on eight occasions and granted on ten other occasions. 88 
There were thirty-seven sea storms, surges, and flooding 
disasters (17% of all disasters); twelve rain and flooding disasters 
(5% of all disasters); eighty-seven ice jams and flooding disasters 
(40% of all disasters); ten erosion and flooding disasters (5% of all 
disasters); twenty-four storms and flooding disasters (11% of all 
disasters); and fifty other flooding disasters (23% of all disasters).89 
Although some ANVs that are vulnerable to flooding and 
erosion have been able to obtain disaster relief and even to relocate, 
many have not. For example, the Native Village of Alaknuk 
obtained eight state and five national disaster declarations (and 
associated funding) related to flooding between 1977 and 2014.90 
But Shishmaref, often cited as one of the villages that is most 
vulnerable to climate change-related flooding and erosion,91 
received only one state disaster declaration during this same period. 
Thus, there may be inconsistencies between ANVs that are most 
vulnerable to climate change and flooding and those that are 
receiving disaster assistance. 
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B.  Challenges for ANVs in Preparing for and Responding to 
Disasters  
1.  Limited Preparation at the Local Level 
At a local level, many ANVs seem ready to face short-term 
emergencies but have limited infrastructure to do so and little 
experience related to what happens once a serious, fast-moving 
disaster strikes. While many community plans mention past 
disasters92 and have strategies relevant to emergencies,93 I did not 
find any stand-alone disaster prevention and response plans similar 
to what exists for some larger communities in the continental United 
States.94 Instead, a number of participants referred to Small 
Community Emergency Response Plans. These are short, easily 
accessible flipbooks based on a state-designed template that provide 
information on emergency contacts, places in the community where 
residents can take shelter, and ways to evacuate. They can provide 
guidance in the event of a disaster but do not look beyond the initial 
disaster to the recovery period.  
There may be a disconnect between the emergency 
preparation measures mentioned in community plans and what ANV 
residents are actually prepared to do. For example, local hazard 
mitigation plans for thirty-three ANVs and four other plans listed 
specific emergency preparedness measures such as emergency 
drills, evacuation alerts, and storm warnings, but none of my 
participants gave any indication that these measures were being 
implemented. Further, a number of plans and ANV community 
members proposed an evacuation road, which may not be feasible. 
As participants outside ANVs pointed out, the funds for a road and 
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the availability of gravel for its construction be challenging to 
obtain, and the construction would require more gravel as the road 
would need to be significantly elevated to avoid storm surge. A few 
participants suggested that a gravel mound within the village would 
be a more cost-effective way to protect from storm surge, given that 
much less gravel would be required for a mound than for a road. 
But, as of yet, ANVs facing storm surges have not been able to 
construct a gravel mound, much less an evacuation road. 
 
2.  Limited Support at the National Level 
My interviews also revealed a sense of frustration on account 
of state and national funding for disaster prevention being relatively 
limited in comparison to response funding and the fact that relatively 
little is being done to address slow-moving disasters such as erosion 
and permafrost melt. Several participants recommended amending 
the Stafford Act to include erosion and climate change in the 
definition of disaster. Yet many were pessimistic about prospects for 
change. One ANV participant said, “It kind of feels like we don’t 
really know how to move forward other than just acknowledging 
that we need to prepare.”95 A few participants expressed the view 
that it would take a disaster that affected middle-class Americans to 
get more substantial funding to address climate-related disasters. As 
one ANV participant said:  
 
“Since 1954, we’ve lost over a quarter of a mile [of 
land]. This year we’re going to lose our water 
supply. We already lost our dump. . . . When a 
hurricane comes to Florida, they immediately issue 
a disaster declaration. But this one has been waiting 
for ten years, fifteen years. We know it’s happening. 
We lose about seventy-five feet a year.”96 
 
Some participants from the federal government believed an 
amendment to the Stafford Act that would allow related funding to 
be utilized in combatting erosion was not likely to be made, for they 
believe that Congress is unwilling to allocate the money that would 
                                                
95 Telephone Interview with Participant No. 35, female tribal employee from 
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96 Telephone Interview with Participant No. 12, male tribal employee from west 
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be needed to address all the resultant disaster declarations that would 
be made by ANVs and similarly situated communities. One FEMA 
employee explained that the Stafford Act is simply not designed to 
address climate change.97 
Views on barriers to disaster prevention parallel views on 
barriers to address climate change more generally: Many 
participants referred to a lack of political willingness to address 
climate change and a tendency to be reactive rather than proactive. 
A former member of the Alaska legislature said, “We don’t plan 
enough and then we react badly.”98 A Native non-profit entity leader 
said, “There’s a system, and the problem is [that] unless it’s broken, 
it doesn’t get done.”99 A supporter of an ANV seeking to relocate 
said, “If you knew that a village was going to be destroyed, what 
would you do? Go to international conferences, write papers, and 
get PhDs? The reality is that nobody . . . is spending any money to 
assist climate endangered indigenous communities. . . . There are 
villages being destroyed today.”100 
 
3.  Little Local Control when Disaster Strikes 
a.  An Unclear and Inefficient Process 
Other than participants who had sought or received national 
disaster declarations, few were familiar with the process. 
Participants who had been through national disaster declarations 
emphasized how important it is for ANVs to understand the disaster 
management process so that a community can articulate its needs to 
FEMA. The flooding disaster in Interior Alaska in 1994 illustrates 
the importance of understanding the post-disaster process. A 
participant who worked with ANVs following the flood described 
how the Village of Alatna, which is located in a boreal forest in the 
middle of Arctic Alaska, was able to use the process to relocate its 
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small community to higher ground.101 Alatna had simple, clear 
demands—residents wanted decent log cabins on a nearby hill out 
of the floodplain.102 Alatna was able to negotiate a timeframe of one 
year for rebuilding the community rather than the normal timeframe 
of three years.103  Alatna chose to forego emergency funding for 
temporary housing structures in the village to increase its investment 
in long-term housing solutions.104 More than one participant 
suggested that the Village of Allakaket (located across the river from 
Alatna) did not have a clear plan, so its money was spent on more 
peripheral needs like snow machines rather than permanent homes. 
Residents opted for temporary houses to be built in the same 
floodplain where many have remained for decades.105  
A participant from another ANV described a lack of clarity 
among community members/leadership regarding the community’s 
options after a disaster, which made negotiations difficult: “Nobody 
understood that if you don’t ask, you’re not going to get anything. . 
. . If you say no to something you need, there’s no turning back, even 
five minutes later. If you say ‘no’ once, that’s it. There’s still cleanup 
that hasn’t happened because of that.”106  
A few participants suggested that FEMA assistance was 
inefficient or not very helpful to the community. One ANV resident 
offered the following description of FEMA assistance:  
 
“For the first three weeks, almost a month . . . they 
had a Learjet that came in at 9:00 or 10:00 in the 
morning and sat there all day. . . . They drove 
around all day and took pictures of themselves and 
the damage. . . . They flew in twenty-four ATVs, 
top of the line, $30,000 each, so they could all ride 
around town . . . then around four o’clock they jump 
in the Learjet and they go back to wherever they 
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104 Id. 
105 KELLEY HEGARTY & ASSOCIATES, ALLAKAKET COMPREHENSIVE PLAN 22 
(1995) (on file with the author). 
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come from. Come to find out, this ended up costing 
about $11 million. . . . To this day, our water plant 
is still flooding. It was never cleaned up.”107  
 
The resident suggested that FEMA missed the opportunity to have 
local residents participate in in disaster recovery by training local 
residents to take photographs themselves.108  
A FEMA representative offered a different view of the 
recovery processes, noting that when a certain ANV flooded, FEMA 
gave each household a choice of having FEMA entirely repair the 
home or receive a grant to rebuild it themselves.109 The families that 
took the home repair grant never completed their homes and left the 
village, whereas the other families who had FEMA help are back in 
the village. The representative suggested that this related to villages 
not being fully immersed in a cash economy—when households got 
handed a large chunk of money, they were not fully thinking through 
the best uses of such funds.110  
The disparate views of the recovery process between the ANV 
residents and FEMA may relate to different ways of handling 
disasters in different ANVs. They may also relate to different 
perceptions of FEMA’s roles and responsibilities versus those of the 
community and its individual residents. 
 
b.  Perception of Unfairness 
Although it may be impossible to design a recovery process that 
is completely fair to all ANV residents, it is important for FEMA to 
aim for fairness. Problematically, a few participants from ANVs 
who experienced disaster declarations said that FEMA funding was 
unfairly distributed between similarly situated communities or 
individuals within those communities. One participant said that 
because he had not agreed to have FEMA buy out (and then destroy) 
his flooded home, FEMA would not help him with anything else, 
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even food. After refusing the buyout, he was not allowed to take any 
emergency food supplies from FEMA.111  
A participant from another ANV said that there was a disparity 
between the way FEMA treated her as a tribal leader and the way 
FEMA treated non-tribal municipal leaders during disaster 
recovery.112 The tribal leader said that FEMA personnel threatened 
her and pointed out multiple times that she would go to jail if she 
lied and that they did not treat the city mayor the same way. Further, 
there was confusion and conflict regarding FEMA’s purchase of 
flooded houses. Some people got to keep their houses that got 
flooded out, while others were told that if they took the purchase 
money, they could not have any part of their old houses.113 It seemed 
to the tribal leader that a disproportional number of non-Natives got 
to keep their houses even though they received buyout money.114 
Some of the conflict and confusion may relate to the legal residency 
requirements for buyouts.115 These laws are not designed to address 
the situation that a number of ANV citizens find themselves in: They 
live in urban areas for employment or health reasons but consider 
their house within an ANV to be their primary home. A participant 
from the same ANV described his frustration over FEMAs refusal 
to buyout the cabin of his mother, who lived in the ANV seven to 
nine months of the year.116  
 
c.  Failure to Provide for Subsistence  
A few participants noted that FEMA generally does not 
provide funding for subsistence food or damage to subsistence 
                                                
111 Telephone Interview with Participant No. 31, male tribal citizen from Interior 
Alaska (Jan. 1, 2017). 
112 Interview with Participant No. 58, female tribal citizen from Interior Alaska, 
in Fairbanks, Alaska (Feb. 28, 2017). 
113 Under FEMA buyout programs, the purchased property is generally required 
to be maintained as open space in perpetuity to restore and/or conserve the 
natural floodplain functions. 42 U.S.C. §5170c(b)(2); 44 C.F.R. §80.11(f). 
114 Interview with Participant No. 58, female tribal citizen from Interior Alaska, 
in Fairbanks, Alaska (Feb. 28, 2017). 
115 FEMA’s post-disaster individual assistance program, which pays to buy out 
damaged homes, only applies to homes that serve as a primary residence. 42 
U.S.C. § 5174(b)(1). Under 44 C.F.R. § 206.113(b)(2), those “who have 
adequate rent-free housing accommodations” are ineligible for housing 
assistance.  
116 Telephone Interview with Participant No. 57, male tribal citizen from Interior 
Alaska (Jan. 15, 2015). 
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equipment. In the words of the FEMA representative, “FEMA 
doesn’t do food.”117 One participant from an ANV showed me 
photos of a subsistence camp destroyed by ice during a storm and 
asked why FEMA did not give disaster funding to subsistence 
infrastructure. Not only is subsistence economically important for 
ANV residents, he said, it is important to preserving the culture: 
“Fish in the freezer is like money in the bank. Fish camp is a vehicle 
to provide food. Subsistence is a job.”118 
To summarize, when representatives of the national 
government enter into an ANV and employ a top-down command 
system to respond to disasters, it is effective in providing immediate 
relief in terms of physical needs. But it can seem unfair, 
inconsiderate, and even colonizing to local residents who do not 
understand the process and do not feel fully involved in the 
recovery. 
 
IV.  DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
While some ANV participants and plans have called for 
more robust measures to prepare for and prevent disasters, funding 
for large-scale infrastructure and relocation generally comes only 
after a disaster declaration. ANVs have relatively few means for 
responding to disasters other than basic emergency plans and 
supplies that meet needs during and immediately after disasters. 
Aside from Newtok Village, which is engaged in a gradual 
relocation to Mertarvik, there is a lack of formal planning at the 
community, state, and national levels regarding what ANV residents 
will do and where they will go when a disaster strikes, and homes 
become uninhabitable. In recent times, this lack of consideration has 
resulted in hasty, top-down post-disaster management that has left 
some ANV residents feeling unfairly treated. In this section, I 
discuss some measures that might improve pre- and post-disaster 
management. 
 
                                                
117 Telephone Interview with Participant No. 152, female FEMA employee from 
Anchorage, Alaska (Jul. 8, 2016). 
118 Interview with Participant No. 23, male tribal citizen from the west coast of 
Alaska, in Nome, Alaska (Jan. 23, 2017). 
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A.  Potential for Amending the Stafford Act 
Among my participants, there have been calls to amend the 
Stafford Act119  so that it is more proactive and inclusive of slow-
moving disasters, such as gradual erosion and permafrost melt. 
Hazards related to climate change that are currently excluded from 
the definition of “disaster” (i.e., “erosion” and “permafrost melt”) 
could be added. A similar change could be made to the state’s 
disaster declaration process, which mirrors the federal process.120  
However, such an amendment, without any further action on 
the part of Congress or FEMA, does not guarantee that badly 
eroding ANVs would get disaster assistance. The literature has 
demonstrated that disaster declarations can be politically motivated, 
such that those with better political connections and understanding 
of the system would be in a better position to get disaster 
declarations than impoverished ANVs.121 To address this, FEMA 
has sufficient discretion under the Stafford Act122 to issue additional 
criteria for who is eligible to receive disaster declarations similar to 
how it has issued criteria for determining the need for public and 
individual assistance.123 There could be some sort of sliding scale 
based on monetary damage thresholds (i.e., how much damage there 
must be to rise to the level of a disaster) based on median incomes 
in the affected regions. Declarations based solely on such a sliding 
scale could negatively affect communities with below-average per 
capita incomes in relatively wealthy states that choose not to spend 
their own money.124 To avoid this impact, there could be an 
exception for declarations involving communities below a certain 
income threshold. There could also be other “vulnerability” factors 
                                                
119 42 U.S.C. § 5122. 
120 The state legislature could amend the Alaska Disaster Act to specifically 
include erosion and permafrost in the disaster declaration definition and to more 
clearly delineate thresholds for when damage rises to the level of a disaster. 
Alaska Stat. §§ 26.23.020, 26.23.900(2). Flooding, storms, and other climate-
change related disasters are already part of the definition of disaster under both 
state and national law. 
121 Supra note 59. 
122 42 U.S.C. § 5170(a). 
123 44 C.F.R. § 206.48. 
124 The Stafford Act in its current form actually prohibits such an effect: “No 
geographic area shall be precluded from receiving assistance under this Act 
solely by virtue of an arithmetic formula or sliding scale based on income or 
population.” 42 U.S.C. § 5163. 
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assessed aside from just income, such as whether the disaster affects 
minority communities or those dependent on subsistence foods.125 
While criteria that limit disaster declarations and financial assistance 
to areas and communities that need it most would reduce the 
flexibility of FEMA and the President to declare a disaster, they 
would increase the likelihood of assistance being directed to where 
it is most needed.  
Changes to the Stafford Act should address the 
disproportionate amount of post-disaster funding compared to pre-
disaster funding. Part of the problem is that the Stafford Act makes 
preventative funding under the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program 
(HMGP) equal to a small percentage of money spent on recent 
disaster declarations, rather than basing spending on the risk of 
future disasters.126 This means that a community that did not get a 
presidential disaster declaration cannot get HMGP funding, 
although it could still apply for the smaller pot of funding available 
through the Pre-Disaster Mitigation Program (PDM). Hazard 
mitigation plans, which are specifically required to assess and 
quantify future risks and damages,127 could serve as a better basis 
for determining the amount of mitigation funding to which a 
jurisdiction is entitled. If a community does not have a hazard 
mitigation plan, its risks could be approximated from those of a 
nearby community and/or the state hazard mitigation plan. 
With regards to FEMA’s cost-benefit rules for HMGP and 
PDM, just as American individuals pay progressively higher levels 
of income tax on greater earnings, FEMA could require households 
and communities with higher levels of income to demonstrate a 
higher benefit to cost ratio for proposed projects.128 Communities 
recognized as “small and impoverished”129 by FEMA could be 
                                                
125 National agencies are already required to consider environmental justice 
concerns in their decision-making. Exec. Order No. 12898, 3 C.F.R. § 7629 
(1994). 
126 42 U.S.C. § 5170c(a) (2018); 44 C.F.R. § 206.432 (2009). 
127 44 C.F.R. §§ 201.4–.7 (2015). 
128 Both statutes, like 42 U.S.C. § 5133(h) (2018) and 44 C.F.R. § 206.434 
(2016), and guidance, like FEMA, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 
HAZARD MITIGATION ASSISTANCE UNIFIED GUIDANCE: HAZARD MITIGATION 
GRANT PROGRAM, PRE-DISASTER MITIGATION PROGRAM, AND FLOOD 
MITIGATION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM at 40 (2013), could be revised to 
incorporate the recommended progressive cost-benefit calculation requirement. 
129 See 42 U.S.C. § 5133(a) (2018). 
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approved for projects with a lower benefit-cost ratio. This would 
be consistent with climate justice, given that many impoverished 
communities, particularly indigenous communities, have not had a 
large historical role in contributing to greenhouse gases but lack 
the means to address climate change impacts.130  
 
B.  Smoothing the Response and Recovery Process 
There may be additional things that FEMA could do to 
smooth the disaster declaration and recovery process, such as more 
consistent adherence to existing FEMA regulations on how money 
is to be spent in disaster recovery.131 FEMA could issue regulations 
expressing a preference for more permanent, climate-appropriate 
housing for residents with a demonstrated interest in staying in the 
village, as opposed to the kind of temporary housing in the 
floodplain that Allakaket received. Cash buyouts under HMGP may 
be more appropriate for those who do not want to be in the village.  
Further, FEMA should consider what functions could be performed 
by residents, rather than flying FEMA workers to and from the 
disaster site each day. FEMA could develop a video or video series 
that could be watched on a smartphone or on DVD to explain how 
the disaster declaration/recovery process works (i.e., options in 
terms of moving buildings or rebuilding, typical timeframes). The 
video could feature residents who went through process (i.e., 
Allakaket and Alatna) talking about and comparing their 
experiences. 
To avoid “colonizing” disaster response, there is a need to 
better integrate subsistence and other Alaska Native lifeway 
concerns into the natural disaster recovery process. The Stafford Act 
already allows FEMA to provide for various personal and work-
related needs for individuals.132 For example, FEMA’s Other Needs 
Assistance (ONA) program specifies some of these needs133 but 
does not mention subsistence. It could be interpreted or specifically 
amended to provide for subsistence-related infrastructure (i.e., fish 
                                                
130 Carmen Gonzales & Sumudu Atapattut, International Environmental Law, 
Environmental Justice, and the Global South,” 26 TRANSNAT’L LAW AND 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 229, 230–233 (2017); Paavola & Adger, supra note 9. 
131 See 44 C.F.R. § 206 (2009), for existing FEMA regulations.  
132 42 U.S.C. § 5174(e)(2) (2018). 
133 44 C.F.R. § 206.119(c) (2002). 
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wheels, cabins where subsistence participants temporarily reside) 
and gear (i.e., nets, boats).134 
  Another way to address subsistence would be for Congress 
to amend the Magnuson Stevens Act and/or the Interjurisdictional 
Fisheries Act135 to add “subsistence” to the section providing for 
disaster relief. This would allow the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Agency (NOAA) to declare and provide relief for 
disasters that specifically affect subsistence.136 Alaska’s separate 
law on economic disasters, which has been used for subsistence, 
could be revised to better address subsistence disasters and provide 
relief to the extent that FEMA fails to address subsistence after 
presidential disaster declarations.  
Short of changing laws, it would be helpful for those who 
may be involved in disaster recovery in ANVs to have some sort of 
cultural sensitivity training and understanding of ANV lifeways. To 
start, various ANVs have already worked with national agencies to 
create videos providing such training.137 
 
                                                
134 Some FEMA officials may already be interpreting ONA to provide for this. 
There is a photo of a fish wheel in FEMA’s press coverage of the Eagle Village 
recovery with the caption, “Salmon Wheels are a necessary tool for the 
subsistence living residents in the upper Yukon and FEMA provides Other 
Needs Assistance (ONA) in the form of grants to those who are eligible for 
federal assistance.” ADAM DUBROWA, SALMON WHEEL IN RUIN (photo. reprint 
(Aug, 7, 2013) (Aug. 8, 2013), https://www.fema.gov/media-
library/assets/images/72358 [https://perma.cc/AZT4-UH87]. 
135 Pertinent sections of both are respectively codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1802 
(2018), 16 U.S.C. § 1861a (2006), 16 U.S.C. § 1864 (2007). 
136 Examples of the kind of relief that would be helpful to subsistence 
participants can be found in an agreement that the North Slope Borough, a 
county-level government in Arctic Alaska, has brokered with various oil 
companies to provide relief in the event of an oil spill: transportation required to 
relocate subsistence hunters and their equipment to alternate hunting sites and to 
safely return the hunters, their equipment and subsistence catch to their village; 
acquisition of alternate subsistence food supplies to replace subsistence 
resources that are otherwise unavailable and transportation of food supplies to 
their designated destination; and assistance for the Alaska Eskimo Whaling 
Commission to restore their International Whaling Commission subsistence 
whaling quota.  EXXONMOBIL & NORTH SLOPE BOROUGH, POINT THOMSON 
PROJECT OIL SPILL CONTINGENCY MITIGATION AGREEMENT (2009).  
137 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., Alaska Native Cross Cultural Communication 





C.  Thinking beyond FEMA and the Stafford Act 
Amending the Stafford Act was participants’ most common 
suggestion for fixing the disaster framework. Based on participants’ 
descriptions of FEMA as taking an emergency, incident command 
approach with limited community participation, however, perhaps 
FEMA is not the best-equipped agency to be charged with long-term 
efforts to avoid disasters. As one state planner told me, “FEMA 
doesn’t have scientists and engineers, it is really just designed for 
disaster response.”138 
It could be more useful to allocate limited funding to 
programs that are more flexible in meeting community needs and 
have longer planning horizons, such as the Community Block 
Development Grants administered by the national Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD).   The legislation and 
regulations authorizing these grants do not specifically provide for 
hazard mitigation activities like elevation and relocation, but it is 
possible that such activities might fall within the permissible 
category of “rehabilitation.” 139 Otherwise, there may be a need to 
broaden HUD’s mandate so that it can better assist communities 
seeking to protect themselves or relocate in the face of climate 
change-related disasters. 
 
D.  ANV Mobilization  
ANVs have faced emergencies and disasters for millennia 
and have a history of sharing resources and being prepared to endure 
temporary discomfort. In modern times, this resilience is evidenced 
by descriptions of emergency preparedness measures, such as 
providing for generators, extra supplies, and family emergency 
kits.140 But emergency preparedness alone will not enable ANVs to 
rebuild after major disasters with the kind of infrastructure to which 
they have become accustomed in modern times. 
                                                
138 Telephonic Interview with Participant No. 94, female Alaska state employee 
(Jul. 28, 2016). 
139 42 U.S.C. § 5305(a)(4) (2014) authorizes “clearance, demolition, removal, 
reconstruction, and rehabilitation (including rehabilitation which promotes 
energy efficiency).” FEMA could adjust 24 C.F.R. § 570.202 (2017) (Eligible 
rehabilitation and preservation activities) to specifically provide for measures to 
reduce the risk of loss from extreme weather events and natural hazards. 




  It would be valuable for ANV residents to agree on what, 
where, and how each village wants to rebuild in the event of a 
disaster that destroys much of their existing infrastructure. This need 
not be some glossy Disaster Recovery Plan prepared by an outside 
consultant. It could be a joint resolution providing a vision for post-
disaster rebuilding passed by the Tribal Council, the council of the 
incorporated city associated with the ANV, if any, and other 
leadership entities in the community. For example, the resolution 
could indicate that new homes will be built in a certain elevated area 
nearby the community. An ANV could also set a priority on who is 
most eligible for new housing (i.e., year-round residents, followed 
by elders and families with children). Finally, given the lack of 
attention to subsistence and other lifeway concerns at the national 
level, ANVs could consider how they will meet their nutritional and 
cultural needs in the event that disaster reduces the population of, or 
access to, an important subsistence resource. This may involve 
informal or formal agreements with other ANVs whose subsistence 
may not be affected. Being proactive could avoid a hasty, unplanned 
disaster response from FEMA that gives rise to a sense of 
colonization and injustice. 
Developing a post-disaster vision and mustering the 
resources to carry it out is easier said than done. From a Western 
standpoint, there is a significant gap in “capacity” between those 
who live in ANVs and those outside ANVs involved in disaster 
response.141 It is important for ANV leaders to improve their 
understanding of state and national resources and processes relevant 
to disaster management. As a start, ANVs can take advantage of free 
disaster management courses offered regularly at FEMA’s training 
institute.142  It is also important for ANVs to build relationships with 
staff at FEMA and the equivalent state agency, as well as other 
agencies that can provide resources.  
 
                                                
141 GAO, supra note 30, at 20; Robin Bronen & F. Stuart Chapin III, Adaptive 
Governance and Institutional Strategies for Climate-Induced Community 
Relocations in Alaska, 110 PROCS. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS. U.S. 9320 
(2013); Loring et al., supra note 17, at 123.  
142 FEMA, EMI Courses and Schedules, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
AGENCY, https://training.fema.gov/emicourses/ [https://perma.cc/X3EC-XU3F] 
(last visited Mar. 2, 2017),  
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V.  CONCLUSION 
The United States and, to a lesser extent, the state of Alaska have 
a system in place to provide funding to Alaska Native Villages and 
other communities struck by major flooding events. However, this 
system does little to address the slow-moving erosion and 
permafrost melt in Alaska, and it can seem unfair, inconsiderate, and 
even colonizing to local residents who do not understand the process 
and do not feel fully involved in the recovery. Not only is there a 
need for more proactive efforts to address disasters related to climate 
change, but there is also a need for better understanding and action 
at two levels. First, at higher levels, there is a need to understand the 
particular concerns of ANVs in terms of their subsistence lifeway 
and the logistical difficulties in obtaining infrastructure and external 
support. Federal laws, or at least agency practices, may need to be 
adjusted to better provide for subsistence concerns in the event of a 
disaster and to level the playing field for ANVs that want to access 
assistance outside of a disaster through FEMA’s hazard mitigation 
programs or other programs. Taking into account the particular 
needs and values of ANVs may help reduce the extent to which 
assistance comes across as colonizing and unjust. Second, there is a 
need for ANVs to plan beyond an initial disaster so that they are 
prepared to fully engage in the recovery process and avoid 
rebuilding in a manner that does not serve community needs and 
values. ANVs should be able to act on the sovereignty that they have 
to make decisions about their future. Doing so will require building 
the capacity to make decisions within the Western framework in 
which these communities find themselves and access the resources 
needed to carry out these decisions. 
